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The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs
for Developing Countriest
A.E. Rodriguez and Mark D. Williamstt
Abstract
We examine whether traditional antitrust policies are appropriate for develop-
ing economies. Economists have typically claimed that antitrust enforcement
does little good in small economies with free trade since imports should temper
anticompetitive behavior. However, some recent trade liberalization programs
have not had the full effect that their proponents had advertised. Specifically,
imports have not adequately tempered domestic market power in a number of
countries that have liberalized trade. Many commentators, arguing primarily
that nontradeables are immune to trade effects, advocate the establishment of
antitrust agencies to correct this problem. However, we believe that this failure
of liberalization suggests the inappropriateness of antitrust policies. We argue
that the continuance of market power is due to interest group rent-seeking rather
than price-fixing or other private cartelizations. In fact, poliymakers in devel-
oping economies are institutionally susceptible to rent-seeking. Interest groups
find soliciting preferential treatment from the state more attractive than carte-
lization. Thus, trade liberalization gives rise to significant state-sponsored non-
tariff barriers, against which antitrust is powerless. We suggest that, at its most
effective, an antitrust agency can have a powerful competition advocacy pro-
gram insulated from political pressure.
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I. Introduction
Liberal trade policy has long been defended by the proposition
that imports discipline domestic producers' market power to raise
prices.1 In broad geographic markets, international competition
forces domestic firms to be competitive. However, trade economists
puzzle over the seemingly insignificant effects of trade liberalization. 2
For example, Moises Naim, Venezuelan Minister of Development and
architect of the 1989 radical liberalization and privatization program
noted in a recent retrospective:
It is usually assumed that the lowering of tariff barriers and the liberal-
ization of imports will tend to curb the pricing excesses of the highly
concentrated local firms; this was clearly not the case in the initial
stage of the Venezuelan experience.3
And, from two advocates of antitrust,
The evidence from the United States, the European Community, and
Japan indicates that it is simply not the case that open borders or large
numbers of competitors or easy entry or ensconced competitive values
have prevented the formation of cartels. 4
The perceived persistence of anticompetitive pricing has resulted
in a number of developing countries adopting antitrust legislation and
enforcement agencies, 5 and has bolstered arguments for increased an-
titrust enforcement. 6 Both the World Bank and developing country
I See RIcHARD E. CAVES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION:
PROBLEMS, SOLVED AND UNSOLVED (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper
No. 1131, 1985) ("[T]he larger is imports' share of domestic sales, the smaller is the effect of
the concentration of domestic producers on the profits earned by those producers."); Louis
Esposito & Frances Ferguson Esposito, Foreign Competition and Domestic Industry Profitability, 53
REV. ECON. & STAT. 343 (1971); Alexis Jacquemin et al., Concentration and Profitability in a
Small Open Economy, 29J. INDUS. ECON. 131, 142 (1980) ("In terms of policy, our results...
suggest that one of the most felicitous public policies to maintain domestic competition is to
condemn any form of protectionism."); Howard P. Marvel, Foreign Trade and Domestic Competi-
tion, 18 EcoN. INQUIRY 103 (1980); Thomas A. Pugel, Foreign Trade and US. Market Perfomance,
29J. INDus. ECON. 119 (1980).
2 See Albert Fishlow, The Latin American State, J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 65 (1990) ("Multiple
cross-section studies demonstrating a favorable impact of exports on aggregate performance
are not fully satisfying."); Steven Cloberman, Trade Liberalization and Competitive Behavior: A
Note Assessing the Evidence and the Public Policy Implications, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 80
(1990) ("A stream of literature has recently emerged that raises questions about the magni-
tude and even the direction of the impact of trade liberalization on competition."); Edward
E. Learner, Cross-Section Estimation of the Effects of Trade Barriers, in EMPIRICAL METHODS FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51 (Robert C. Feenstra ed., 1988).
3 Moises Naim, The Launching of Radical Policy Changes, The Venezuelan Experience: 1989-
1991, in VENEZUELA: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 56, 107-08 (Joseph S.
Tulchin ed., 1992).
4 Janusz A. Ordover & Russell W. Pittman, The Role of Antitrust in Eastern Europe, REG.
Summer 1992, at 5.
5 All Eastern European countries, several of the former Soviet Republics, and a
number of African and Latin American countries have recently inaugurated or increased
antitrust scrutiny. See infra note 6.
6 SeeJonathan D. Glater, Busting Trusts, South of the Border: Latin Countries Take Antitrust
Lessons from U.S. to Open Markets, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1993, at BI.
Antitrust practitioners and scholars have advocated inclusion of antitrust policy as a rec-
ommended component of World Bank development policy or as an integral measure of lib-
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policymakers, in a dove-tailing of interests, have embraced the ineffec-
tiveness of trade liberalization as a rationale for increased antitrust
scrutiny.7 Janet Steiger, the Chairman of the United States Federal
Trade Commission, has recently described antitrust as "largely an
American-made product" and one of her country's most successful ex-
ports.8 Similarly, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust during
George Bush's tenure, James Rill, accomodated the expected increase
in demand for antitrust assistance by establishing "a new Competition
Policy Section in the Antitrust Division, whose main function will be to
provide economic support for international activity."9 Indeed, the
Bush administration specifically advocated antitrust for developing
countries: "A basic antitrust law aimed at preventing cartel behavior by
firms producing the same product and mergers that create monopoly
is essential."10
Not surprisingly, the export of antitrust policy has drawn scathing
eralization programs. See Roger Boner, The Basics of Antitrust II: Emerging Market
Economies (The World Bank forthcoming); Robert Bradburd & David R. Ross, Regulation
and Deregulation in Industrialized Countries: Some Lessons for LDCs, (The World Bank 1990);
Malcolm Coate et al., Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating Government and Business, 24 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 37 (1992); William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Economic Develop-
ment, and the Transition to Free Markets in the Third World: The Case of Zimbabwe, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. (1992); William E. Kovacic & Roger S. Thorpe, Antitrust Law for a Transition Economy,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 16; James Langenfeld & Marsha W. Blitzer, Is Competition Policy
the Last Thing Central and Eastern Europe Need?, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 347 (1991); Russell
Pittman, Merger Law in Central and Eastern Europe, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 649 (1992)
("Merger enforcement will be an important complement to the more obvious components of
anti-monopoly enforcement (demonopolization, import liberalization, and dominant-firm
regulation) in the transformation of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe."); Russell
Pittman, ANT1MONOPOLY LAWS IN A DEVELOPING MARKET ECONOMY, draft, Department ofJus-
tice (undated), published in Czech language in NARODNI HOSPODARSTVI 32 (1991);James F.
Rill, Competition Policy and Economic Efficiency: Providing the Framework, in COMPETITION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 59, 59 (1991) (recommending to developing countries an "antitrust
framework along the lines of those that have evolved in the United States and other OECD
member countries as being the best way of securing and preserving competitive markets");
Robert D. Willig, Anti-Monopoly Policies and Institutions, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONO-
MIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Basil Blackwell ed., 1992) ("While the fundamental importance and
difficulties of these steps cannot be overstated, it would, nevertheless, be a serious error to
omit anti-monopoly policy from the list of free-market essentials or to leave it for last as an
afterthought."); James F. Rill, The Implementations of Competition Laws in Central and
Eastern Europe: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, Remarks Before the International Con-
ference on Competition Law and Policy (Oct. 3, 1991) (on file with authors). Apart from
Kovacic and Coate et al., most commentators have directed their analysis specifically towards
Eastern Europe. However, similar ongoing FTC and DOJ aid initiatives in Latin America and
Africa suggest that recommendations to these countries will be similar to those for Eastern
Europe. Moreover, the recent (May 3-4, 1993) World Bank Conference on Competition Pol-
icy directed at Latin America underscores this focus on antitrust.
7 See CLAUDIO FRISCHTAK ET AL., COMPETITION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES
(1989); VINOD THOMAS ET AL., LESSONS IN TRADE POLICY REFORM (1990).
8 Trustbusters, Inc., ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 1991, at 84.
9 James F. Rill, International Antitrust Policy-A Justice Department Perspective, Re-
marks Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Program on EC and U.S. Competition
Law (Oct. 24, 1991) (on file with authors).
10 President's Message to Congressional Leaders Transmitting the 1991 Economic Re-
port, 1 PUB. PAPERS 134 (Feb. 12, 1991).
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criticism, most reflecting the view that imports will sufficiently temper
market power."1 In this Article, we further question the effectiveness
of antitrust in developing economies. We recognize that imports may
not fully eliminate market power in recently liberalized countries.
However, we argue that this does not suggest that antitrust is the ap-
propriate remedy. We argue that non-tariff barriers to trade will re-
place tariffs that trade liberalization removes because of the political
power of rent-seeking special interest groups.1 2 Antitrust is il!-pre-
pared to counter market power generated by government
protection. 13
Next we discuss the relationship between endogenous trade the-
ory14 and why import competition has seemingly been unable to coh-
trol market power. Part III examines the economics of interest groups
1I See Roger Boner &James Langenfeld, Liberal Trade and Antitrust in Developing Nations,
REG., Spring 1992, at 5; Paul E. Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Does Not Need, REG.,
Winter 1992, at 21 (blasting American antitrust advocacy to Eastern European. countries that
have recently enacted antitrust laws and established enforcement agencies); Ordover & Pitt-
man, supra note 4, at 5; Paul E. Godek, Protecting Eastern Europe from Antitrust, REG., Fall 1992,
at 4 (responding to Ordover and Pittman's article). For other criticisms of the export of
antitrust, see the Fall 1990 issue of REG. For a general criticism of antitrust, see DOMINICK T.
ARMENTANO, ANTrTRUST AND MONOPOiL. ANATOMY OF A PoLicy FAILURE (1992) (rejecting
virtually all antitrust enforcement). See also Lester C. Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws,
N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 19, 1980, at C2. Although these critics attack American antitrust, it is proba-
bly safe to assume they feel similarly about other antitrust regimes.
12 A "rent" is a return in excess of a resource owner's opportunity cost. Rents can arise
naturally or as a result of a government action. When rents are created from short term
shifts in, for example, tastes or technology, the pursuit of these rents, or "rent-seeking," is no
different from "profit-seeking." However, rents can also exist through government action,
but this does not mean that they are exempt from competition. The study of rent-seeking
examines how people or groups compete for government-created rents.
There are several economic problems associated with artificially-created rents and associ-
ated rent-seeking activities. First, the monopolization of these rents results in an allocatively
inefficient distribution of resources away from the monopolized sector. Second, all resources
spent in the successful and unsuccessful pursuit of artificial rents are lost to society because
they yield no additional social product. Similarly, resources used to protect rents from other
people and groups generate no social product. These secondary expenditures of resources
in the pursuit of artificial rents may constitute a far larger cost than the direct distortion due
to market power. See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KviLos 575 (1982).
13 Apart from the traditional objections to antitrust policies and the criticism within this
paper, many groups, although generally supportive of the implementation of antitrust in
theory, remain apprehensive of possible misuse of antitrust law. For example, commenting
on competition policies recently inaugurated in Eastern Europe and other newly emergent
market economies, the American Bar Association recently noted, "other antitrust prohibi-
tions and emerging patterns of enforcement give cause for concern that the law might be
applied too intrusively. The abuse of dominance law could, if applied unwisely, effectively
restore price control under the guise of antitrust, thus taking back the freedom and rewards
that the market gives." Introduction and Recommendations of ABA Antitrust Law Section's Special
Committee on International Antitrust, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1551, at 171
(Feb. 6, 1992). Note that the ABA's caveats are consistent with our hypothesis. Specifically,
the possible abuse of antitrust law could be interpreted as a non-tariff barrier to trade, and
the establishment of antitrust agencies lowers the costs of rent-seeking.
14 Endogenous trade theories have tariff levels determined within a model, and are
derived by combining trade and public choice models. For example, Findlay's model mar-
ries a specific factors trade model with a median voter political model. See Ronald Findlay,
The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power for LDCs, 2 ECON. & POL. 193 (1990).
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seeking rents through government protection and why incentives for
this are higher in developing countries. Part IV highlights the likely
results of increasing antitrust enforcement. Part V discusses alternative
approaches to reducing market power,. and we conclude in Part VI.
H. Protectionism in Response to Import Competition
A cornerstone of neoclassical economics-and of antitrust analy-
sis 5-is the belief that reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
will promote imports that will discipline domestic supracompetitive
pricing.16 In fact, this prescription was a fundamental part of the pol-
icy package of reforms for the developing world known as the "Wash-
ington consensus." 17 Trade reform has also figured prominently in
World Bank and IMF proposals.'
Traditional economics suggests that free trade policies are a
cheaper means of preserving competition than antitrust enforcement
for small economies. 19 However these theories often have not consid-
ered distortions arising from interest groups seeking favors from
policymakers. Results from economic theory may change dramatically
15 See, e.g., Symposium, Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets, 64 CHL-KENT
L. REv. (1988) (addressing how the internationalization of markets and of competition af-
fects antitrust law and antitrust policy); Joint Manufacturing Opportunities for Small Business:
How High the Barriers?: Hearings on H.R 423 Before Subcomm. on Antitrust, Impact of Dereg., and
Piivatization, and Subcomm. on Reg., Bus. Opportunities, and Energy of the House Comm. on Small
Bus., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (Feb. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (Statement of Charles F.
Rule: "[Foreign competition] makes it unlikely that cooperative production ventures among
U.S. firms would give those firms the ability to exercise market power and harm competitors
and consumers."); U.S. Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,555 (1992), reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559 (Special Supp. Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Horizontal Merger
Guidelines] (used by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department ofJustice to evalu-
ate the likelihood of anticompetitive effects of mergers between competitors, and recogniz-
ing the potential procompetitive impact of foreign imports).
16 A large number of empirical industrial organization studies examined this concept
by comparing changes in domestic competitive performance to changes in tariffs. See supra
note 2. For another study of the relationship between domestic profits and import levels, see
Emilio Pagoulatos & Robert Sorensen, Domestic Market Structure and International Trade: An
Empirical Analysis, 16 Q. Rav. ECON. & Bus. 45 (1976). This research has concluded that
import competition tends to reduce price-cost margins and thus constrains domestic prices.
17 LATIN AMERICAN AjUSTMEr: How MucH HAS HAPPENED? 1 (John Williamson ed.,
1990).
"Washington" meant primarily the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, and the U.S. executive branch, although the term was intended to cover
also at least the Inter-American Development Bank, those members of Con-
gress who take an interest in Latin America, and the think tanks concerned
with economic policy. A summary description of the content of this Washing-
ton agenda is macroeconomic prudence, outward orientation, and domestic
liberalization.
Id. (laying out the policy changes that Washington had been urging the Latin American
countries to make).
18 See DEMETRIOS PAPAGEORGIOU ET AL., LIBERALIZING FOREIGN TRADE IN DEVELOPING
CouRm'Es: THE LESSONS oF EXPERIENC (1990); VINOD THOMAS et. al., supra note 7.
19 See Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Does Not Need, supra note 11; Godek, Protect-
ing Eastern Europe from Antitrust, supra, note 11; Hearings, supra note 15.
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once this endogenous rent-seeking behavior is allowed. This may ex-
plain why the recent trade liberalizations seem so weak in combatting
market power.20 Producer interest groups may respond to increased
import competition with innovative forms of anticompetitive behavior.
Theories of endogenous protectionism predict that private domestic
interest groups will respond to potential loss of rents by intensifying
their lobbying efforts. 21 Higher losses of rents cause proportionately
greater lobbying activities.
Theorists of endogenous tariffs, 22 rent-seeking 23 and other related
fields have found a direct correlation between reduced tariffs and the
rise of non-tariff barriers.2 4 This indicates that interest groups may
20 A firm or group of firms acting together have market power if they face downward
sloping demand curves and have the power to influence prices. A firm or cartel with market
power can profitably charge a price above that determined under competition. As such,
when price is above marginal costs, society suffers welfare losses due to the misallocation of
resources away from sectors where firms have market power. See DENNIS W. CARLTON &JEF-
FREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 737 (1990).
21 Many modem political economy theories of regulation view government activity as
the outcome of competition between interest groups for access to the political process and its
redistributive power. For a closely related interest group theory of legislation, see Robert
Tollison, Regulation and Interest Groups, in REGULATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 59
Jack High ed., 1991). For theories of endogenous-tariff formation, see infra note 22. For
theories of rent-seeking, see infra note 23. These theories share the assumption that govern-
ment policymaking arises from a noncooperative game rather than a cooperative "public
interest" game. Our definition of "interest group" is not the same as in the interest groups
theory. Rather, we use the term to refer to any firm, trade association, or similar organiza-
tion that uses the political process to obtain protective regulation or other non-tariff barriers
to deny entry to a potential competitor.
22 See generally JAMEs ANDERSON & ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL MARKET FOR PRO-
TECTION IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (World Bank Working Paper No.
492, 1981); ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY (1985); REAL
P. LAVERGNE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. TARIFFS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1983); STE-
PHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY. POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (1989); William A. Brock & Stephen P. Magee, The Eco-
nomics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 246 (1978); Anne 0.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 291 (1974); Wolf-
gang Mayer, Endogenous Tariff Formation, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 970 (1984); Edward John Ray,
Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers in the United States and Abroad, 63 REv. ECON. & STAT. 161 (1981);
Edward John Ray, The Determinants of Tariff and Non-tariff Restrictions in the United States, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 105 (1981); Stanislaw Wellisz & Ronald Findlay, Protection and Rent-Seeking in Devel-
oping Countries, in NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE ANALYSIS OF RENT-SEEKING AND
DUP ACTIITIES 141 (David Colander ed., 1984).
23 See generally JAMES A. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCI-
ETY (1980); R.E. McCormick, The Strategic Use of Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1984); Charles K. Rowley &
Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL AD-
JUSTMENT (Heinz Hauser ed., 1986); Robert D. Tollison, supra note 12. For an attempt to
group related theories from many fields in economics, see NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL ECON-
omr. THE ANALYSIS OF RENT-SEEKING AND DUP ACTIVITIES (David Colander ed., 1984) (survey-
ing the literature and collecting papers by several of the original contributors to the theory).
24 See generally Daniel Trefler, Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection:
An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy, 101 J. POL. ECON. 138, 139 (1993) (showing that
"[w]hen trade protection is modeled endogenously, its restrictive impact on imports is large,
ten times the size obtained from treating protection exogenously"). For a critique discussing
the difficulty that endogenous trade theorists have in tying theoretical constructs to empirical
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find soliciting protective regulation more attractive than either com-
peting or cartelizing. 25 Economic benefits sought through political
means with anticompetitive intent are considered by most economists
to be wasteful because of the accompanying reduction in social
welfare. 26
As liberalization programs are implemented, domestic interest
groups that have traditionally benefited from high tariffs and other
government favoritism resort to soliciting non-tariff barriers as a means
of continuing their control over home markets. Government action,
such as establishing product standards, environmental standards, local
purchasing preferences, exemptions from restrictions on specialization
and export-sharing agreements, anti-dumping legislation, 27 trade-rem-
edy laws, 28 and formal and informal vertical restrictions such as exclu-
sive dealing arrangements, often result in the establishment of these
non-tariff barriers. 29 This can impose a significant cost on the
economy.3 0
A promising hypothesis to explain the low rate of price decline is
that non-tariff barriers that perpetuate anticompetitive pricing persist
or even arise after trade liberalization. This hypothesis suggests that
the orthodox competition policy for small economies of free trade is
inappropriate. Moreover, the erection of non-tariff barriers seems, at
first, to support the establishment of antitrust regimes.
Traditionally, antitrust advocates justify interventionist policies by
alleging a market's inability to deal with particular structural
problems.3' Of course, other rationales are mentioned in political de-
formulations, see Douglas Nelson, Endogenous Trade Theoy: A Critical Survey, 32 Am. J. POL.
Sci. 796 (1988).
25 Robert E. Baldwin, Assessing the Fair Trade and Safeguard Laws in Terms of Modern Polit-
ical Economy Analysis, WoRLD ECON., Mar. 1992, at 185, 193-94.
26 See T.N. Srinivasan, Neoclassical Political Economy, the State and Economic Development, 3
ASIAN DEV. REV. 38 (1985).
27 See generally PATRICK A. MESSERLIN, ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS OR PROCARTEL LAW?
THE EC CHEMICAL CASES (World Bank Working Paper No. 397, 1990). "[A] ntidumping regu-
lations are a device that domestic firms-which would not be able to collude if there were no
protection-can easily capture for cartelizing domestic markets." Id. at Foreword.
28 See Thomas Coughlin, U.S. Trade Remedy Laws: Do They Facilitate or Hinder Free Trade?,
73 REv. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis 3 (1991) ("[T]he concept of fair trade and trade
remedy laws are often used by special interest groups to pursue their own agenda at the
expense of the national interest.").
29 For a discussion of how these policies can act as non-tariff barriers, see ANDERSON &
BALDWIN, supra note 22; BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY, supra note
22.
30 These barriers raise prices for imports and their protected domestic substitutes.
Moreover, they result in allocative inefficiency. In an economy at full employment, increased
imports in an industry force resources to be employed in other sectors where they can be
used more productively. By producing goods and services in which it has a comparative
advantage and importing the rest, a nation can increase its income available to consume and
invest. Since increased protection distorts the relative prices away from costs, it leads to an
inefficient allocation of resources.
S The focus of American antitrust enforcement has historically been on market struc-
ture, especially concentration levels. Although one still finds proponents of the structural
1994]
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bate and the details of any program often reflect the strengths of coun-
tervailing political forces, not reasoned argument exclusively.32
Several competing hypotheses explain an increase in demand for anti-
trust. First, increased antitrust activity could be due to the conven-
tional public interest assumptions that a workably competitive
marketplace will achieve a more efficient allocation of resources,
greater efficiency in production, and increased innovation. 33 This as-
sumes the state is benign and maximizes welfare. This "naive" premise
has come under intense criticism especially from the "New Political
Economy School", which views government officials as seeking private
goals, giving rise to endogenously-determined policies.3 4
Second, it is possible that government officials incorrectly infer
what antitrust can accomplish. Apart from anecdotal vignettes we
found no clear evidence that the objectives of antitrust have been mis-
interpreted. 35 It is, however, more likely that diverse interest groups
view government antitrust policies as privately beneficial. 36
Third, the adoption of antitrust is one of a number of mechanisms
whereby developing countries can signal investors that investment in
their countries is attractive. For example, in a recent statement, a De-
partment of Justice official, referring to recently passed antitrust legis-
lation in Eastern Europe, noted, "They recognize the importance of
approach, the new "law and economics" learning has shifted this focus to overall market
efficiency and the short term interests of consumers. For the most part, American antitrust
has challenged activities that restrict competition and lead to higher consumer prices. See
generally ROBERT H. BoiK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978);
RCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Frank H. Easter-
brook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1984).
32 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
33 See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 6-34 (1974).
34 Unlike the more traditional economic analysis, the New Political Economy does not
assume that the government is composed of Platonic guardians and acts benevolently, seek-
ing the public interest. In the New Political Economy, rational agents, using available infor-
mation in forming future expectations maximize their private gains. For example,
bureaucrats fight for turf or to distribute publicly-created rents. This methodology predicts
the implementation of policy by examining the costs and benefits that accrue to all agents.
Thus the ultimate shape and impact of any policy prescription is dependent upon both the
interests and political strengths of all interested agents. By contrast, economics had tradi-
tionally viewed governmental policy as an exogenous deus-ex-machina. Analysts often accepted
the superficial rationale for various policies and just examined the implications of each gov-
ernment policy. See, e.g., POLITICS AND POLICY-MAKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Gerald M.
Meir ed., 1991).
35 But see Joan Nelson, The Political Economy of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity, and
Public Response, in TOWARD A POLICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT 80, 91-92 (Robert H. Bates
ed., 1988) ("In some cases, ministers and political leaders simply have very limited economic
backgrounds and understanding. This can be true in any country, but it is more likely in
countries with short history of independence and comparatively few highly educated
people.").
36 This certainly appears to be the case in the United States. See William S. Comanor,
Antitrust in a Political Environment, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 733, 734-735 (1982) (observing that
two sets of interests provide critical support for the American antitrust laws: the first source
of ideological support is the American political tradition distrustful of corporate or business
power; a second critical group relates antitrust policies to corporate legitimacy).
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maintaining a competitive marketplace to attract trade and foreign in-
vestment, and to promote the vigor of their domestic economies." 37
However, researchers have found exactly the opposite-that antitrust
activity fosters investor uncertainty.38
Fourth, assuming that non-tariff barriers are fairly close substitutes
for tariff barriers, an interest group that controls government policy
might allow tariff liberalization. This allows the government to claim
victory to international lenders. In turn, to placate internal opposi-
tion, the government would swiftly establish antitrust as a non-tariff
barrier.
Fifth, the referral of a troublesome matter, such as the rise of gaso-
line prices after tariff removals, to an "independent" antitrust author-
ity, enables the executive to effectively defuse potentially troublesome
demands for action by affected groups. These are only a subset of the
possible explanations for the demand for establishment of antitrust
policies, but none appear to us to explain the current interest in estab-
lishing antitrust policies in developing countries.,
Both proposed and recently adopted antitrust policy recommen-
dations for developing countries have, for the most part, been remark-
ably restrained. 39 These programs reflect the American antitrust
experience of the past decade-an economic approach with a mini-
malist view as to the proper scope of these laws as business regula-
tion.40 The minimalist "Chicago School" view of antitrust "seems to
favor little other than prosecuting plain vanilla cartels and mergers to
37 Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust: Looking Ahead, Address Before the Anti-
trust and International Sections of the American Bar Association 2 (Aug. 9, 1993) (transcript
on file with authors).
38 See, e.g., George Bittingmayer, Stock Returns, Real Activity, and the Trust Question, 47 J.
FIN. 1701, 1702 (1992) (finding that in the United States, during the first half of the century,
"antitrust case filings and other enforcement events are linked with lower stock prices").
39 See Ley Federal de Competencia Economica, D.O. (Dec. 24, 1992), a Mexican law which
serves as an especially clear example. By contrast, the recently-enacted Venezuelan law is
much more restrictive. However, the Venezuelan antitrust agency has been writing inge-
niously minimalist "Rules" ("Reglamentos") to implement the law. In practice, Venezuelan
and Mexican antitrust policies are similar. See Ley para Promover y Proteger el Ejercicio de la Libre
Competencia, GAZETA OcItAL, Jan. 15, 1992; Reglamento de la Ley para Promover y Proteger el
Ejercicio de la Libre Competencia: Sobre el Regimen de Excepciones, GAZETA Onct&L, Jan. 21, 1993.
40 See Robert Pitovsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 818 (1987)
("The only matters that regularly attract the attention of the enforcement authorities are
cartels, horizontal mergers tending to create a monopoly, and various forms of predation....
[El nforcement agencies have introduced various exceptions and qualifications into prior law
and today tend to resolve most doubts in favor of nonintervention.").
Unfortunately, Professor Pitovsky fails to discuss the increasing influence of "Chicago
School" analysis in the federal courts and how this affects an agency's decisions. Agencies
will less vigorously pursue cases when they believe that the chances of winning in court are
lower. With the greater influence of the Chicago School, U.S. antitrust agencies may have
pursued only the strongest cases. For an understanding of the main tenets of the Chicago
School, see BoRx, supra note 31; Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1696 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
925 (1979).
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monopoly."41 However, despite continued recognition of the detri-
mental and anticompetitive effects of many forms of regulation, 42 few
distortionary rules and regulations are overturned once the explicit
link between regulatory barriers to competition and the influence of
interest groups in the political process is noted. Policies to sever gov-
ernment's role in obtaining market power for interest groups are
rarely discussed. Policies that do confront government protection of
rent-seeking interest groups are generally limited to small competition
advocacy programs. 43
Antitrust policy in developing countries (or anywhere else, for
that matter) is ill-suited to challenge this "new protectionism" of non-
tariff barriers. As such, the impact of trade liberalization on domestic
competition often depends critically oncboth the institutional structure
of the government and how amenable that structure is to interest
group influence.
I1. The Economics of Protective Regulation
Many analysts have noted a tendency for non-tariff barriers to in-
crease as tariffs decline.44 If non-tariff barriers replace liberalized tar-
iffs, effective government protection may remain unchanged after
trade reform. One needs to assess this reaction of higher non-tariff
barriers to trade liberalization when evaluating the potential of anti-
trust policy changes.
All else equal, competitive markets tend to keep prices close to
costs and there are few incentives for foreign firms to import. 45 In
contrast, the wide differences between prices and costs found in an-
ticompetitive industries are likely to invite import discipline.4 6 Import
competition is thus expected to constrain prices more in highly con-
centrated industries that face foreign competition. Put differently, im-
port competition is a countervailing force against whatever power
domestic firms may have to raise prices above the competitive and so-
cially efficient level.
The responses of producers to trade liberalization are determined
41 Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 1701.
42 See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 233 (1991).
43 See Coate et al., supra note 6, at 57 ("Government economists and attorneys prepare
comments on proposed policies of other federal and state government agencies.... [Thus
tlhe antitrust agencies ensure that the relevant decision makers are exposed to the competi-
tive consequences of their proposed actions.").
44 See Trefler, supra note 24; Nelson, supra note 24.
45 Obviously, if foreign firms have a cost advantage over domestic firms, there may be
plenty of incentives to import, regardless of the institutional details of the particular market.
46 William F. Chappell & Bruce Yandle, An Entry Model ofImport Penetration, 19 ATLANTIC
ECON.J. 22, 27 (1991) (finding that "increases in imports are positively related to the level of
pre-level concentration."). But see Don P. Clark et al., Domestic Market Structure and Interna-
tional Trade in an Open Economy, 32 Q. REv. ECoN. & FIN. 3, 12 (1992) ("Results fail to confirm
that industry concentration exerts a positive influence on imports.").
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by the resulting distribution of winners and losers from this policy.
With a prospective reduction in rents due to increased import compe-
tition-clearly a threat to producer group stability-the threatened
group will establish or increase its lobbying pressure on political pow-
ers. One commentator has argued an interest group's influence is af-
fected not only by the number and size distribution of its members,
but also by the extent to which its common interests are threatened. 47
Government favors and the resulting supracompetitive prices are col-
lective goods to the interest group; the benefits obtained go to each
producer in the favored industry. Developing economies often have
few firms in many industrial sectors and thus have small producer in-
terest groups.48 Because each member gets a significant fraction of the
benefit from action, these interest groups are relatively easy to organ-
ize in response to a potential loss of rents. Thus, one would expect, a
priori, that defensive responses by domestic interest groups to trade
liberalization are likely to be more vigorous in concentrated industries
where potential for losses of rents is higher.
The link between group dynamics and the seeking of preferential
treatment via non-tariff barriers is well understood. 49 Often these non-
tariff barriers are in the form of government regulation, which often
benefits the regulated producers rather than the public. Models that
endogenously predict when interest groups will seek preferential treat-
ment offer useful insight in our analysis of the importance and useful-
ness of antitrust in developing countries. These theories assume the
rationality of homo economicus in studying politics and government. 50
As such, theorists assume that interest group behavior is a determinant
of protectionist government policies. Until recently, it was customary
to analyze economic policies and their effects assuming the policies
were determined exogenously. Tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, as
well as other types of anticompetitive regulation, arise when govern-
ment officials, politicians and bureaucrats-acting formally in the
47 See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (arguing that an interest group's influence is affected not
only by the number and size distribution of its members, but also by the extent to which its
common interests are threatened).
48 Partrio Meller, Industrial Concentration in Latin America, 27 J. INDUS. ECON. 41, 45
(1978) (arguing, on the basis of a survey of the structure of industrial concentration, that in
manufacturing sectors, "Latin American countries that have smaller (larger) market sizes
systematically show higher (lower) levels of industrial concentration.").
49 See supra notes 22-23; MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STACFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); PEDRO FRAILE-BALBIN, INDUSTRIALIZA-
CI6N Y GRUPOS DE PREs1ON: LA ECONOMIA POLITICA DE LA PROTECCION EN ESPAf4A 1900-1950
(1991) (providing a recent examination of Olson's approach applied to tariff dynamics).
50 The term homo economicus refers to people acting rationally to explain their social,
economic, and political behavior. See SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A
CRITCAL GUIDE 62 (1992) ("Homo economicus is an instrumentally rational and calculating
seeker of preference satisfaction. He is the figure who typically appears in neoclassical eco-
nomic theory as a maximizer of utility."); Jack Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics,
75 Am. ECON. Rev. 53 (1985).
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state's interest, but whose underlying motivation may be the maximiza-
tion of private gains-"sell" protectionism demanded by producer in-
terest groups.
If interest groups face low transaction costs in agreeing to petition
the government, their incentives to support a competitive market are
less than the potential gains from seeking rents through political ac-
tion.51 The ease of access in the structure of government and the
political process in most Latin American countries result in preferen-
tial treatment through protectionism.
Government intervention in the marketplace distorts prices and
resource flows from socially efficient levels. 52 Although it is an impor-
tant issue in all countries, government intrusion is particularly prob-
lematic in Latin America and other developing countries. This is
because policy making tends to be less visible, more closed, and more
centralized in these countries. Often the political process is so closed
that citizens learn of new policies when they are formally announced
or decreed by the political leadership.53 In general, policy making is
dominated by high level administrators and politicians.54 It is the ex-
ecutive branch, not the legislative branch, which tends to be the target
of those seeking political favors. 55 Many members of the executive do
not face electoral review and often their tenure in office is highly
indeterminate. 56
Because of the difficulty of organizing large groups, producer
groups tend to be more influential than consumer groups. Olson's
free-rider problem suggests that large, diffuse interest groups find pro-
tecting their interests difficult.57 Although a protective policy may
greatly and adversely affect consumers in a group, the stake of any par-
ticular consumer is normally too small to justify individual political in-
vestments. Moreover, organizing consumers to aggregate their
51 See William Glade, Privatization in Rent-Seeking Societies, 17 WORLD DEv. 673, 680
(1989) ("For decades, rent has been distributed lavishly to buy political support. Constitu-
ency building, in turn, has been used to yield a kind of political rent to the governments in
charge of this extensive system of differential reward.").
52 Resource allocation in the production of widgets is said to be "socially efficient" if the
price (marginal social benefit) of widgets equals the marginal (social) opportunity cost of
producing another widget. If the opportunity cost of producing another *widget, which is the
value of the resources if diverted to their highest-valued alternative use, is less than the price
of widgets, which is the marginal consumer's valuation of widgets, then it would be socially
efficient to produce more widgets. Competition tends to equalize the marginal opportunity
costs of production with the price of goods. Distortional government intervention drives a
wedge between prices and marginal opportunity costs and hence will not be socially efficient.
53 For a more accurate and detailed description of the process summarized in this sec-
tion, see MERILEE S. GRINDLE, THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 24 (World Bank Working Paper
No. 304, 1989), reprinted in PoLITcs AND POLICY MAKING IN DEVELOPING CouNrES (Gerald
M. Meir ed., 1991).
54 Id. at 24.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See OLSON, supra note 47.
ANTITRUST IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
political investments is difficult because any benefits will be spread
over all consumers-regardless of whether they actually invest. Well-
organized consumer groups could, in principle, provide an effective
counterweight to producer groups in the fight for political influence.58
The producer interest groups, by comparison, are often compact, fo-
cused, and their members highly interested in proposed policies, and
therefore better able to marshall political investments. 59 Indeed, an
optimal policy for firms in oligopolistic markets who are under severe
import competition may be to take actions, such as reducing produc-
tion and laying off workers, that increase the likelihood of receiving
import protection from the goverment.60
Interest groups, especially the well-organized and well-connected,
wield their political influence behind the scenes in informal interac-
tions with political leaders rather than through more visible activities
such as getting-out-the-vote campaigns. Other interest groups,
although engaged in less intimate lobbying efforts, nonetheless make
their interests known. In the case of the military, the implicit threat of
a coup is a powerful, legitimate, and always credible threat that tem-
pers any legislator's desire to challenge the generals' interests. 61 Simi-
larly, large foreign investors may articulate their desires in a nonpublic
manner.62 In other cases, interest groups may be in a mutually depen-
dent relationship with particular government agencies, politicians, or
political parties.63 These bureaucracies, politicians, or political parties
58 Some of these disenfranchised groups, often not organized for sustained political
activity, frequently make demands by striking, rioting, or marching in protest.
59 See Russell Pittman, Market Structure and Campaign Contributions, 31 PUB. CHOICE 37, 38
(1976) (showing, with American data, that individuals associated with firms in concentrated
industries were more likely than those associated with firms in unconcentrated industries to
make contributions to President Nixon's re-election committee, if the industries were depen-
dent in certain important ways upon government decisions).
60 See Michael P. Leidy & Bernard M. Hoekman, Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent-Seeking:
Free Trade Under the Prospect of Protection, 3 ECON. & POL. 111 (1991).
61 The two coup attempts in Venezuela, the impeachment of President Carlos Andres
Perez, and the subsequent reversal of the liberalization process underscore this argument.
See M. Delal Baer, Revenge of the Venezuelan Dinosaurs, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1993, at A13 (di-
rectly linking the impeachment of President Perez to the threatened interests of influential
Venezuelan industry groups); Carlos Ball, Venezuela's Crossroads: Market Revival or Socialism
Redux, WALL ST.J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A7. Albeit somewhat extreme, a coup attempt is a rather
effective non-tariff barrier to trade.
62 See Tor Skalnes, The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe, 29 J.
DEv. STUD. 401 (1993) ("[A] government's economic policies.., are the outcome of pres-
sures both from domestic and external authors."). Note that Zimbabwe recently passed anti-
trust legislation. See Kovacic, supra note 6, at 257; see also Paul Mosley, On Persuading a Leopard
to Change His Spots: Optimal Strategies for Donors and Recipients of Conditional Development Aid, in
TOWARD A PoLrTCAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT 47, 47 (Robert H. Bates ed., 1988). See gener-
ally Symposium, The Political Economy of Debt, 39 INT'L ORG. 357 (1985).
63 See Peter H. Schuck & Robert E. Litan, Regulatory Reform in Peru, REG.,Jan.-Feb. 1987,
at 36 [hereinafter Schuck & Litan I] ("Large corporations, engaged in classic anti-competi-
tive, rent-seeking strategies, had developed a symbiotic relationship with the national govern-
ment which was willing to secure rents for its corporate allies through the exercise of its
regulatory authority."). See also Peter H. Schuck & Robert E. Litan, Regulatory Reform in the
Third World: The Case of Peru, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 51 (1986) [hereinafter Schuck & Litan II].
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may find it difficult to terminate or even weaken these relationships. 64
Krueger, describing the dynamics of rent-seeking, observes that
market responses to economic policies affect the political equilibrium
and, in turn, induce changes in economic policy.65 The adoption of
lower tariffs with the expectation of increased imports enhances cer-
tain groups' ability to influence the political process relative to others'.
By changing the relative strengths of different interest groups, the
political equilibrium is altered. 66 The lowered tariffs may have unan-
ticipated effects and fail to achieve its supporters' expectations. 6 7
These effects may strengthen or weaken the policy regime and may
lead to pressure to eliminate or change various policies to favor partic-
ular sectors. Political equilibrium is not just a function of competing
interests, but also a function of overall economic performance. When
a liberalization program affects economic performance, particularly
the level of consumption, it will also influence the government's over-
all level of support.68 This, in turn, may constrain or change policy
decision-making. Indeed, poor economic performance may make leg-
islators and government officials more responsive to claims of dispro-
portionate duress caused by economic liberalization. 69
IV. The Effect of Antitrust
We have discussed how the fundamental competition problem in
developing economies is the interest groups' ability to influence gov-
ernment to raise non-tariff barriers in response to liberalization poli-
cies. Indeed, governmental institutions in these countries seem to be
exceptionally vulnerable to pressure from interest groups. Although
many analysts have recommended competition advocacy programs to
64 See Ana Julia Jatar, Competencia o Componenda, ECONOMIA Hoy, Oct. 5, 1993, at 6
(describing mechanisms used by interest groups in Venezuela to obtain private benefits from
the state).
65 Anne 0. Krueger, Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development, 83 Am. ECON.
REV. 351 (1993).
66 See Paul H. Rubin & Mark A. Cohen, Politically Imposed Entry Barriers, 18 E. ECON. J.
333 (1992) (finding that political entry barriers are endogenous).
67 See Dani Rodrik, Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developing Countries, 36 J.
DEv. ECON. 229 (1991).
On the one hand, entrepreneurs, workers, and farmers must respond to the
signals generated by the reform for the new policies to be successful. On the
other hand, rational behavior by the private sector calls for withholding invest-
ment until much of the residual uncertainty regarding the eventual success of
the reform is eliminated.
Id.
68 See RolfJ. Luders, Massive Divestiture and Privatization: Lesson from Chile, 9 CoNrrEmp.
POL'Y IssuEs 1 (1991) (noting that the initial Chilean privatization effort failed "partly due to
the economic and financial crisis affecting most Latin American countries in the 1980s").
69 All else equal, a comparatively disadvantaged industry is likely to receive tariff protec-
tion since it can generate greater sympathy from policymakers and the general public. Thus,
such an industry is likely to bear the brunt of trade liberalization. See ANDERSON & BALDWiN,
supra note 22; LAVERGNE, supra note 22.
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advise agencies against establishing trade restraints, these advocacy
programs have generally lacked enforcement powers.
In fact, antitrust laws have been on the books of several develop-
ing countries for a long time, but they have done little to reduce an-
ticompetitive behavior. This suggests that the laws have been ignored
because they run counter to the perceived national interest, that the
agencies in charge of enforcement have been captured, or that the
laws simply could have been ineffective. 70
The fundamental objective of proposed antitrust regimes is to at-
tack horizontal price-fixing under a per se standard. 71 All proposals
also contain a competition advocacy function as an essential compo-
nent.72 However, all these proposals recommend a passive advocacy
role, whereby the antitrust agency will only advise when other agencies
request comments.
There are several limitations to advocacy roles as proposed. First,
these advocacy programs often require administrative procedures that
are either undeveloped or unknown in developing countries.73 Sec-
ond, without a formal administrative law procedure that invites public
comment, it is difficult for the competition advocate to discover poten-
tially anticompetitive regulations on the drawing board. 74 Third, the
antitrust agency would be unable to force other agencies to heed its
recommendations. Fourth, even if the antitrust agency were successful
in opposing anticompetitive regulation, it may find itself vulnerable to
bureaucratic turf warfare. 75
70 See GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
IrNmusRY 259 (1968); UNCTAD Secretariat, Control of Restrictive Business Practices in Latin
America, 21. ANrrrusr BuLL. 137 (1976) ("Direct control of restrictive business practices
through antimonopoly legislation has in general been of only marginal significance.").
71 See Coate et al., supra note 6, at 81.
72 See id. at 56-57. See also Schuck & Litan II, supra note 63, at 63-67. A competition
advocacy program was implemented in Peru in the late 1980s as part of a broader regulatory
reform program. Id. The advocacy program consisted of technocratic and regulatory analy-
sis "designed to expose and limit rent-seeking regulation that chiefly benefits politically influ-
ential economic interests and imposes large costs on society." Id. at 53.
73 See id. at 65.
The system of administrative law so familiar to the U.S. system was quite alien to
Peru. The process of rule making in Peru was remarkably straightforward: a
ministry wishing to adopt a rule simply published it in the final form in El
Peruano, the official government newspaper. Private individuals or groups had
no legal right to participate in the rule-making process in any way, and there
were no sanctions, judicial or otherwise, for routine bureaucratic illegality.
Id.
74 In the case of Venezuela during the Perez administration, the competition office,
known as Procompetencia, was able to monitor closely proposed rules and regulations be-
cause a member of that office was married to one of the most important ministers and had
close friendships with most of the rest of the cabinet. Thus, the competition office effectively
opposed many anticompetitive initiatives at the cabinet level. Venezuela, like most code law
countries, has no administrative procedures inviting public comment on proposed rules and
regulations.
75 The fate of Vice President Quayle's Competitiveness Council is illustrative. See Ken-
nethJ. Cooper, Divided House Bars Funds for Quayle Competitiveness Counci4 WASH. Post, July 2,
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We now examine the effects of a traditional antitrust regime that
concentrates on attacking horizontal price-fixing. Market and govern-
ment structures in developing economies allow producers to choose
whether to obtain anticompetitive rents from either cartelization or
seeking favors from the state. Interest groups will choose that combi-
nation of collusion and government protection which maximizes ex-
pected rents.
As shown below, rent-maximizing interest groups will devote re-
sources between attempted cartelization and government influence











Figure 1 demonstrates this tradeoff. The level of benefits (excess
rents) obtained by the interest group increases in both the amounts of
rent-seeking and cartelization effort the group undertakes. Iso-benefit
curves bl, b2 and b3 draw out sets of the amount of effort devoted to
the two strategies (lobbying the state or organizing a cartel) that yield
the same levels of expected benefits to the group. In the drawing, if
the interest group chooses a point on curve b2, it expects greater prof-
its than a point on bi. Similarly, b3 offers greater profits than b2. The
iso-resource lines follow equations of the form r = PLL + pcC, where r is
1992, at A6 (the House voted to deny funding to the Competitiveness Council chaired by
Vice President Quayle); Bob Woodward & David S. Broder, Quayle's Quest: Curb Rules, Leave
'No Fingerprints'" WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at Al (looking into how Vice President Quayle
used "his chairmanship in the President's Council on Competitiveness as a command post
for a war against government regulation of American business"). Similarly, the Federal
Trade Commission's weak competition advocacy function may be due to the Commission's
general reluctance to antagonize other agencies.
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the total resources that the group will allocate to these activities, PL is
the unit price of lobbying the government for protection, L is the level
government lobbying, pc is the unit price of organizing, monitoring,
and enforcing a cartel, and C is the level the cartel activities. For any
given level of resources r, the group will attempt to reach the highest
iso-benefit curve. Thus, a group will choose its level of activity at the
point where the iso-revenue line is tangent to the iso-benefit curve. 76
Consider for the moment an interest group having iso-resource
curve rl. With this constraint, it will choose x on curve b2 where its
expected benefits are maximized. If an antitrust agency is established,
Pc, the unit, price of cartelization efforts, rises and this shifts the
group's iso-resource curve to r2 . Note that r2 intersects the rent-seek-
ing effort axis at the same point as rl because the cost of rent-seeking
has remained the same. The group then shifts its composition of ef-
forts to point y on curve bl. Obviously, economies of scale and scope
in political influence may cause different firms to face different relative
prices for particular resources. However, as the costs of cartelization
rise relative to rent-seeking, at the margin, 77 the interest group will
seek more rents through government protection. The establishment
of an antitrust regime may cause an increase in other forms of govern-
ment protection. If the starting of an antitrust agency only makes it
more difficult to cartelize, the special interest group is worse off than
before.
The intent of antitrust initiatives is to encourage market compte-
tion. In reality, however, interest groups will follow their incentives
and shift resources into monopolization through government protec-
tion.78 Lobbying the government for protection may be highly substi-
tutable for organizing cartels. Private monopolists have the same
incentives as competitive firms to minimize costs by producing effi-
ciently with the appropriate technology and factor mix. In addition to
allowing prices above costs, government non-tariff barriers may en-
courage firms to no longer minimize costs.- In this sense, antitrust may
cause inefficiencies that are worse than the allocative losses that it is
designed to defend against.
76 This methodology is discussed in any good introductory or intermediate
microeconomics textbook as a basic model of consumer behavior. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD,
MicRo-ECONOMICS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS ch. 22 (11th ed.
1980).77 The marginal rate of substitution is the instantaneous slope of the iso-benefit curve.
This slope is steeper at point y than point x.
78 Trade protection is designed to protect domestic industry from international compe-
tition. Such protection establishes monopoly.rents in markets where long-run domestic sup-
ply elasticities are finite. Inevitably, trade protection has a domestic rent-seeking
constituency prepared to fight for the creation and retention of protectionist policies& Inter-
actions between these rent-seeking constituencies determine the precise protectionist policy
that will emerge in the political marketplace. Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-
Seeking and Trade Protection, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 154, 154 (Heinz
Hauser ed., 1986).
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Indeed, the previous analysis assumes that antitrust will be effec-
tive in raising the costs of cartelization. By establishing an antitrust
agency, these proposals may also establish yet another target for rent-
seeking by interest groups.79 This can be analyzed as a fall in the price
of rent-seeking effort.80 Referring to the previous figure, the fall in
that price will shift the firm resource constraint from r2 to r 3 . The in-
terest group would then maximize its expected benefits on the iso-ben-
efit curve b3 at point z. If the price of rent-seeking falls, interest groups
will seek even further protection at the margin. Indeed, the special
interest groups may be better off with both the increased price of pri-
vate cartelization and the reduced price of rent-seeking if b3 is to the
right of b2 (as shown).81 The establishment of an antitrust regime may
actually advantage targeted special interest groups that act
anticompetitivcly.
Also note that interest groups will lobby to obtain exemptions
from antitrust enforcement. In the United States, numerous statutory
exemptions, which may be partial or complete and can apply to partic-
ular industries, organizations, or activities, are a measure of how com-
petition policy can be compromised. 82 All these exemptions were
79 There is a voluminous literature on this point. See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical
Analysis of Antitrust, 13J. L. & ECON. 365 (1970); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1969) (claiming "that Federal Trade Commission investigations
are undertaken at the behest of corporations, trade associations and trade unions whose
motivation is at best to shift the cost of their private litigation to the taxpayer and at worst to
harass competitors"). See also WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, ANTITRUST POLIcy AND INTEREST
GROUP POLUTICS 36-49 (1990) (advancing a private interest theory of antitrust, suggesting that
enforcement was seldom in the public interest and often used to protect particular competi-
tors at the expense of competition and efficiency); Bruce L. Benson et al., Interest Groups and
the Antitrust Paradox, 6 CATO J. 801 (1987) (arguing that "the antitrust laws are a result of a
special interest struggle between small and large economic entities seeking changes in the
general economic environment rather than the specific favors usually associated with special
interest legislation"); Roger L. Faith et al., The Antitrust Pork Barre 15 J. L. & ECON. 329
(1982). But see Russell Pittman, Antitrust and the Political Process, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN IN-
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 147, 147-60 (David B. Audretsch & John J. Siegfried eds., 1992);
Russell Pittman, William Shugart's Antitrust Policy and Interest Group Politics, 7 REv. INDUS. ORG.
91-95 (1992) (book review).
80 As the technology to rent-seek expands, the costs of rent-seeking cannot go up ceteris
paribus and if the new technology, lobbying the antitrust agency, is more efficient than other
technology, lobbying congressmen, for example, then the cost (price of effort) of rent-seek-
ing falls.
81 Whether the interest group is better off depends upon the size of the shifts in prices
of rent-seeking and cartelization, as well as the position of the original equilibrium and the
shape of the iso-benefits curves.
82 Most sectors have received their exemptions from Congress. Major league baseball,
exempted through a 1922 Supreme Court decision stating that games are not interstate com-
merce, is a notable exception. See Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); accord Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See generally
Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging
Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 729 (1987). Other exemptions based on the
scope of the Commerce Clause have been overturned only recently. For example, as late as
1974 the federal courts held that the practice of law was a learned profession and, therefore,
not part of commerce. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421
U.S. 793 (1975).
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secured by rent-seeking interest groups seeking preferential govern-
ment treatment, yet claiming some legitimate public purpose.8 3
The United States experience with antitrust exemptions is not im-
pressive and suggests little to recommend it to other nations. How-
ever, none of the antitrust proposals advanced for developing
economies contain mechanisms that would effectively limit interest
groups from engaging in rent-seeking behavior. Assuring that decision
makers receive a well-balanced analysis of the competitive repercus-
sions of proposed legislation appears to be the sole alternative avail-
able to a competition agency's efforts to limit interest group influence.
V. Policy Alternatives
In the previous section, we noted that effective antitrust raises the
costs of cartelization. Unfortunately, especially in developing econo-
mies, these higher costs increase the relative attractiveness of seeking
Other exemptions to antitrust laws abound. The insurance industry enjoys exemptions.
SeeJONATHAN R. MACEY & G. MILLER, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS (1993). So does the agricultural industry. See Alan M.
Anderson, The Agricultural Cooperative Antitrust Exemption, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 396 (1982);
Alice S. Horneber, Comment, Agricultural Cooperatives: Gain of Market Power and the Antitrust
Exemption, 27 S.D. L. REv. 476 (1982). The petroleum industry is in some cases exempt. See
Gary D. Libecap, The Political Economy of the Establishment of the Interstate Oil Cartel, 1933-1940,
in RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 53 (Supp. 4 1985).
As noted, some exemptions are statutory, as in the case of the export trading firm ex-
emption. See the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1918),
amended by the Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21 (1988), under which firms
in the United States may cartelize their export operations with immunity from the antitrust
laws. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (1988). Moreover, firms may set a common industry export price,
establish export quotas for members and assign exclusive trading areas overseas. See Wilbur
L. Fugate, The Export Trade Exception to the Antitrust Laws: The Old Webb-Pomerene Act and the
New Export Trading Company Act, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (1982). For a more detailed
exchange over the antitrust immunity for shipping conferences, see David A. Butz, Ocean
Shipping Economics: Free Trade and Antitrust Implications, 11 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 69 (1993);
James D. Reitzes, Ocean Shipping Economics: Comment, 11 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 81 (1993);
David A. Butz, Ocean Shipping Economics: Reply, 11 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 86 (1993).
Other exemptions have been suggested. See, e.g., Stephen P. Paschall, Antitrust and Hos-
pital Mergers: A Law and Economics Rationale for Exemption, 30 DuQ. L. REv. 61 (1991).
For a general treatment of antitrust exemptions, see HERBERT HOVENEAMP, ECONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw (1985).
83 The rationales for antitrust exemptions are varied. Several different justifications
have been suggested. Among these are: the disparity of economic power between persons in
the particular category and their competitors, suppliers, or purchasers, see, e.g., April v. Nat'l
Cranberry Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D.Mass. 1958); equity considerations, see, e.g., Robin-
son-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13-13b, (1988); the interests of Federalism, see, e.g., Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-351 (1942); exercise of political rights, see, e.g., Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. 127, 136-38 (1961) with accord
given in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965). In Noerr the
Court held generally that private parties may petition the government seeking anticompeti-
tive relief without violating antitrust laws. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-38. In Pennington the Court
stated that seeking such relief did not violate the antitrust laws "even though they intended to
eliminate competition." Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. For a more detailed description of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see generally Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to
Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L.
REv. 80 (1977).
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government protection. However, the analysis of restraint of trade
through cartelization or government protection is the same. The guid-
ing principle of antitrust economics-restraints on competition harm
consumers-applies equally well to the study of government barriers as
to cartelization. This suggests that an antitrust agency is uniquely qual-
ified for a competition advocacy role in government. Indeed, FTC
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga recently advocated targeting govern-
ment anticompetitive restraints in the United States.84 Because of the
susceptibility of government agencies to private influence in develop-
ing countries,8 5 shifting antitrust resources to competition advocacy
against anticompetitive regulations is likely to be more effective there
than in developed economies.
When considering regulations, it is important not to take the cyni-
cal view that all regulation is anticompetitive, protectionist, and driven
by special interest influence. Indeed, some interest group regulation
may be procompetitive.8 6 A competent competition advocacy role
must determine whether a particular regulation is, in fact, anticompeti-
tive and whether it is the result of interest group pressure.8 7
We suggest that competition advocacy should attack regulations
meeting the following criteria: If a particular regulation restrains mar-
ket rivalry,88 we Would then determine whether the policy was enacted
at the initiative of a producer interest group. If the regulation does
not restrain competition, then it should not be challenged. If, on the
84 Mary L. Azcuenaga, The Tariff Is Still the Mother of the Trust, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 359
(1990).
85 There has historically been an intense collaboration between the government and
private sector in most developing countries. This traditional symbiosis has only recently been
altered as liberalization policies have been adopted. Competition agencies face the daunting
task of challenging, for example, accumulated human capital associated with personal con-
tacts and traditional rules of doing business. These have often resulted in anticompetitive
practices under the new competitive regime. We see this lag because liberalization regimes
have focused on macroeconomic correctives and largely ignored distortional microeconomic
regulations and business practices. See generally GRINDLE, supra note 53; Ana Julia Jatar, Im-
plementing Competition Policy on Recently Liberalized Economies: The Case of Venezuela,
Procompetencia Working Paper, Caracas, Oct. 1993 (on file with authors).
86 Examples are disclosure requirements and the creation of marketable property
rights. Adequate disclosure of certain information allows buyers and sellers to make more
informed choices and may lower transaction costs and allow markets to function more effec-
tively. Externalities can be overcome, for example, by establishing marketable rights to en-
gage in particular sorts of conduct such as pollution or production of a patented product.
Eventually those willing to pay the most to exercise these rights (for example, those for whom
the cost of avoiding pollution is greatest or cost of producing a product is least) will buy up
the rights.
87 See James S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HAav. L. REv. 713
(1986).
88 If no strong historical evidence is available, this condition may be analyzed by relying
on the hypothetical price test approach used by the U.S. antitrust agencies in their investiga-
tions. The antitrust agencies ask whether a firm or a group of firms acting as the only present
and future seller of the product (a hypothetical monopolist) could profitably impose a
"small, but significant and nontransitory" price increase. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, supra note 15.
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other hand, a regulation is anticompetitive, it has met a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for attack. There are many types of regula-
tions that may be socially beneficial yet may restrain competition.8 9 A
proposed regulation should not be challenged if it directly solves a se-
rious market (or social) failure-one that creates an otherwise una-
voidable efficiency loss likely to outweigh efficiency losses caused by
the regulation. 90 If the costs of the regulation outweigh it benefits, the
regulation should be scrapped. 91 To limit the scope of regulations
that should be tested, Olson's insight suggests that we concentrate our
attention on those anticompetitive proposals stemming from producer
interest group lobbying. 92
The experience of competition advocacy runs through the anti-
trust agencies in the United States has been disappointing.93 Because
89 As with the regulation of natural monopoly, the regulation of spillover costs (also
known as externalities) may reduce social deadweight loss. E. Mishan, The Postwar Literature
on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9J. ECON. LrIERATURE 1 (1971). However, there are a
number of scholars who have argued that externalities need not justify heavy-handed govern-
ment intervention, but rather a rearrangement of private property rights. See generally Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral 85 HAev. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property
Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
90 Oil and gas field regulations may be necessary to counteract the "Rule of Capture"
property law which gives a producer title to all oil from a well even if that well drains oil from
parts of the reservoir underneath adjoining property owners. To the extent that regulations
reduce such "common pool" problems, they will increase economic efficiency and consumer
welfare. Alternatively, to the extent that regulation reduces production and increases prices,
it reduces economic efficiency and consumer welfare. See STEPHEN McDONALD, PETROLEUM
CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES 31-33 (1971).
91 Economic "impact statement" requirements have been repeatedly proposed and
often implemented both by the American Executive and Congress. Stephen Breyer notes
several proposals designed to highlight the costily distortions caused by regulation. Breyer,
supra note 32, at 353-64. For example, President Ford, by executive order, required agencies
to write "inflationary impact statements." Under this order, agencies would need to deter-
mine the costs of their proposed action and alternative, less costly ways of dealing with the
problem. President Carter rescinded this order, and, in its stead, ordered "regulatory impact
statements." Under Carter's order, before an agency took a major action, it was required to
state both the action's objectives and alternative ways of achieving them. Id.
Congress has also considered the impact statement approach. A 1980 reform bill by
Senator Ribicoff, for example, would have agencies consider the economic consequences of
major rules. Senator Kennedy introduced a bill in 1979 that would require a "competitive
impact statement." An agency would have to show, before taking an action that would sub-
stantially lessen competition, that the agency's statutory objectives could not be satisfied us-
ing a less restrictive alternative. Id.
Breyer notes several major significant weaknesses of these proposals. The final decision-
making authority often remains within the agency and that almost all regulation, even when
far too restrictive and undesirable, has some plausible justification. Id.
92 Coordination becomes more difficult as the number of players increases. See RUSSELL
HARDIN, CoLLECTIvE ACTION 43 (1982); OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrwE ACTION, supra note
47, at 53; OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS, supra note 49, at 29; MICHAEL TAYLOR,
THE PossIILrrY OF COOPERATION 8 (1987).
93 See BREYER, supra note 32, at 364-65 (recounting the futility of "competitive impact
statements").
In every instance one can find claims, evidence, and argument that will support
regulation.... Thus, it will not be difficult for agencies to reach a decision and
then to write whatever impact statement is needed to justify it. The temptation
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the policy has been passive, many regulations that should have been
challenged have not been. The agencies are almost never asked to
comment on proposed legislation. Furthermore, the agencies suffer
political pressure from above, from the President and Congress,94 who
both are lobbied by producer interest groups, to limit their advocacy
roles. Even if the agencies have written position papers against pro-
posed regulation, these briefs are routinely ignored. 95 All of this sug-
gests that if competition advocacy is to be effective in developing
countries, the role and powers of the agency responsible for its imple-
mentation may need to be specified and defined in the country's legal
body that is least susceptible to political pressure. Although constitu-
tions in developing countries seem quite malleable given American
standards, they may be least subject to political whim. Alternatively,
competition advocacy could be established through trade treaties with
other countries, which would raise the costs of abandoning such poli-
cies.9 6 Although a competition advocacy agency may be made less vul-
nerable to the day-to-day political pressures of society, this may not
guarantee its effectiveness in the long run.
If such a competition advocacy role is established, its major target
must be the agency making the proposed regulation. Challenging lob-
bying efforts by producer interest groups raises objections to limiting
the traditional constitutional rights to petition one's government and
to freedom of speech.9 7 Given government's distaste for interagency
for the agency to do so will be great, because its staff, through inertia, will tend
to favor existing regulatory directions. And in many agencies it is common
practice first to reach a decision and then to have a special opinion-writing
section compose a statement in justification.
Id.
94 See B. Dan Wood &James E. Anderson, The Politics of US. Antitrust Regulation, 37 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 1 (1993) (finding that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is
.strongly affected by the major U.S. political actors, including the president, Congress, and
courts").
95 Politicians will not necessarily embrace a program on the efficiency grounds advo-
cated by positive economic analysis. Politicians, being human, may be driven by narrower
pursuits, such as political survival and effectiveness. Stigler recognized how private incentives
may affect regulation. See George Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, REG., May-June 1982, at
13. Several scholars have highlighted the importance of political and economic forces in
understanding regulatory policies and the limitations of regulatory reform efforts. For exam-
ple, Hahn & Hird, supra, note 42, at 259, recommend Roger Noll, REFORMING REGULATION:
AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS (Studies in the Regulation of Economic
Activity, 1971).
96 It has been suggested that the North American Free Trade Agreement is a result, at
least partly, of Mexican President Salinas de Gortari's desire to "lock in" his liberalization
program. See, e.g., J. William Middendorf, Conservatives'Misguided Case Against NAFA, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at A19; J. William Middendorf, NAFTA's Prospects Depend on Vindicating
Reagan's Legacy, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A17.
97 For the comments raised by critics of Professor Wiley, supra note 87, reflecting this
objection, see William H. Page, Capture, Clear Articulation and Legitimacy: A Reply to Professor
Wiley, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1343 (1988); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational
Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1988). But see
James S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: A Reply, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1327
(1988).
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squabbling, it is unlikely that such competition advocacy will be effec-
tive. 98 Even a limited advocacy function for a government competition
agency is unlikely to be very effective challenging anticompetitive inter-
est group influence. Perhaps competition advocacy may be better ac-
complished through private sector think tanks, which are not as
subject to political pressure, but which may be less effective in ob-
taining early word of proposed regulations or the ear of the agency
promulgating these rules.99 We are not encouraged by past attempts
at competition advocacy by government agencies. In the only cases we
have found, the initiatives were instituted, implemented, and eventu-
ally frustrated by a lack of governmental enforcement and support
from an apathetic private sector.100
VI. Conclusion
We have argued that the recent antitrust initiatives proposed by
antitrust experts are inappropriate or, at least, inadequate for most de-
veloping economies. These proposals have typically advocated en-
forcement of a per se standard against horizontal price-fixing.
However, rather than cartelization, the salient problem in developing
countries appears to be the ease with which interest groups successfully
petition public authorities to raise non-tariff barriers to competition in
response to reductions in tariffs, impositions of antitrust regimes, and
other liberalization programs. Often, the gain to interest groups of
establishing cartels or price-fixing schemes are outweighed by simply
soliciting preferential treatment from the state. If potential monopo-
lists are uninterested in cartelizing, then the role of antitrust is slight.
In analyzing the theory of interest groups, one concludes that at-
tacking producer-backed trade restraints is an appropriate constituent
in any structural reform program for developing countries. Such a
competition advocacy program should speed the dismantling of pri-
vate and public restrictions upon freedom to contract and contribute
to the country's commitment to a market economy. In principle, an
antitrust agency is uniquely qualified to do this job. Charged with
countering interest group lobbying for government protection, the an-
98 See James Q. Wilson & Patricia Rachal, Can the Government Regulate Itsel?, 46 PuB.
I E-REsT 3 (1977) ("Even within the same level of government, an agency will have great
difficulty in attaining its goal, if, to do so, it must change the behavior of another agency.").
99 Due to the lack of formal administrative law procedures for incorporating public
comments on rulemaking, even private think tanks would face difficulties in presenting in-
dependent opinions. In addition, no real political constituency for regulatory reform exists
in developing countries. See Schuck & Litan II, supra note 63, at 65-66.
100 See id. at 53. See also Ball, supra note 61, at A7. The new Venezuelan agricultural
minister, having listened to the complaints of rich farmers and cattlemen, has proposed to
reverse the great strides to a market economy in foodstuffs. New restrictions on 209 key
imports will become effective September 21, 1994, when imported goods as diverse as ce-
ment, rice, auto parts, fertilizers, toys, and detergents will have to be registered and approved
by a brand new government bureaucracy, the Autonomous Certification and Norms Service.
Id.
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titrust agency could help prevent subversion of economic restructur-
ing. As such, the antitrust effort could provide a valuable stimulus to
market forces and the economy. In practice, however, we doubt that
any nation, developing or not, has the willingness or commitment nec-
essary for such a controversial initiative.
Those who advocate the export of antitrust to developing econo-
mies should reconsider the effectiveness of their prescriptions and ad-
dress the shortcomings of such proposals outlined here. At the very
least, we believe that these advocates' rosy predictions of the potential
of antitrust should be tempered.
